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Abstract
This paper examines the stability conditions of the equilibria in a
market where prot-maximising and CSR rms coexist in the presence
of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is
stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensi-
tivity to consumer surplus. In addition, a mixed oligopoly equilibrium
is stable if the number of CSR is su¢ ciently low.
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1 Introduction
Firms embracing a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) regime take into
account not only the shareholder interests (prot), but also how the rm
decisions a¤ect the agents dealing with the rm (stakeholders), such as em-
ployees, business partners, consumers and environment.1
The purposes of a rm choosing to follow CSR rules are not necessarily
related to environmental or social care. Lambertini and Tampieri (2010)
show that, in a Cournot oligopoly where an environmental externality takes
place, one rm adopting CSR rules (i.e., internalising its own pollution and
caring of consumer surplus) obtains higher prots than the prot-seeking
competitors. Hence a rm can decide to be CSR not because moved not by
altruistic behaviour but by economic convenience. What the analysis carried
by Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) puts aside is the possibility that rms
can change their type. In particular, if the CSR rm makes higher prots
it is natural to imagine that prot-seeking rms may want to shift to CSR,
casting doubts on the stability of the equilibrium.
In this paper we depart from that standpoint by showing the condi-
1There is not a unique denition of Corporate Social Responsibility. To cite some, for
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development in its publication Making Good
Business Sense (Holme and Watts), Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing
commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the
local community and society at large . The CSR denition used by Business for Social
Responsibility is Operating a business in a manner that meets or exceeds the ethical,
legal, commercial and public expectations that society has of business . The European
Commission hedges its bets with two denitions wrapped into one: A concept whereby
companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment.
A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. For a
summary, see www.mallenbaker.net/csr/denition.php.
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tions for which a mixed oligopoly equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where
prot-seeking and CSR rms coexist, is stable. We take the same setup of
Lambertini and Tampieri (2010), studying a static Cournot oligopoly where
production determines a negative environmental externality and one CSR
rm is present. Compared to Lambertini and Tampieri (2010), here we con-
sider a pre-market stage where rms can change type both in a duopoly and
oligopoly, and we study the conditions such that mixed equilibrium is stable.
Our results show that a low impact of productivity on pollution and a
high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus allows stability of a mixed duopoly.
Moreover, in the oligopoly case the mixed oligopoly is stable if number of
CSR rms needs to be su¢ ciently low. Then we show an example of the
results of oligopoly through a numerical simulation.
The literature on CSR only recently started developing in the economic
literature2. One strand identies CSR with creation of public goods or cur-
tailment of public bads (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003, Kotchen, 2006, Besley
and Ghatak, 2010), generally showing that there is a close parallel between
CSR so dened and the results obtained by the models of private provision
of public goods. Other contributes study the desirability of CSR (Baron,
2001), the role of CSR in selecting motivated agents (Brekke and Nyborg,
2005) or the rm competition in the presence of greenconsumers (Arora
and Gangopdhyay, 1995 and Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzís, 2009) or social
pressure (Baron, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
2For an overview, see Benabou and Tirole, 2010. For a series of articles on non-market
strategy in the form of Corportate Social Responsibility, see the volume 16, issue 3 of the
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007. For some empirical contribution,
Chatterji et al. (2009) analyse the e¤ectiveness of social ratings as a measure of CSR,
while Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010) test whether Corporate Social Responsibility
is driven by strategic considerations by empirically studying the link between competition
and rmssocial performance.
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the framework. Section 3 examines the results in the duopoly case. Section 4
shows the oligopoly case and a numerical example of it. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We study a static oligopoly market where n  2 rms compete à la Cournot.
Firms supply a homogeneous good, whose market demand function is p =
a Q; a being a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation price
and Q being the sum of all rmsindividual output levels q. Production takes
place at constant returns to scale with a marginal cost c 2 [0; a) ; common
to all rms. Throughout the paper, for the sake of simplicity we set c = 0.
The production of the nal output goes along with a negative environmental
externality E = gQ, where g > 0 represents the marginal polluting intensity
of output. Consumer surplus is measured by CS = Q2=2.
There are two possible rm types: prot-seeking or CSR. We de-
note a generic prot-seeking rm as ps 2 f1; ng, and their prot function as
ps = (p   c)qps. We denote a generic CSR rm as csr 2 f1; ng. According
to the European Union Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility , CSR
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business oper-
ations. Within the company, socially responsible practices primarily involve
employees and relate to issues such as investing in human capital, health and
safety, and managing change, while environmentally responsible practices re-
late mainly to the management of natural resources used in the production.
Out of the company, CSR practices involve a wide range of stakeholders:
business partners and suppliers, customers, public authorities and local com-
munities, as well as the environment3.
Thus we need to assume a specic CSR objective structure. For the
environmental concern, we assume that the CSR rm internalises its own
3See http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/denition.php.
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share of pollution. All the other social concerns can be interpreted in our
model as part of consumer surplus, hence we assume that the CSR rm is
sensitive to it. Thus the CSR objective function is:
~csr = csr   gqcsr + zQ
2
2
; (1)
where z 2 [0; 1] denotes the weight that rm csr assigns to consumer surplus.
The timing is as follows. At stage 1, every rm decides whether to be
a prot-seeking or a CSR type. At stage 2, they compete in quantities.
The equilibrium concept considered is the subgame perfect equilibrium by
backward induction.
3 Duopoly
We rst examine the case with n = 2. In the stage 1, rms 1 and 2 can
decide whether to be prot-seeker or CSR, according to the prot of the
second stage (Matrix 1).
2
PS CSR
1 PS ps; ps 
M
ps ; 
M
csr
CSR Mcsr; 
M
ps csr; csr
Matrix 1
The superscript M stands for mixed duopoly (one rm being prot-seeking,
the other being CSR). If both rms decide to be prot-seeking, the equilib-
rium is the PS (i.e., the standard Cournot-Nash) duopoly with qps =
a
3
and
ps =
a2
9
. If both rms decide to be CSR (CSR duopoly), the quantities in
equilibrium are:
qcsr =
a  g
3  2z : (2)
5
By looking at qcsr, note that the sensitivity to consumer surplus z expands
the output while the impact of productivity on pollution reduces it. Prots
are:
csr =
(a  g) (a (1  2z) + 2g)
(3  2z)2 : (3)
In the case where one rm chooses the prot-seeking type and the other
chooses the CSR type, the market equilibrium is given by:
qMps =
a(1  z)  g
3  z ; (4)
and
qMcsr =
a (1 + z)  2g
3  z : (5)
Through the interplay in the competition stage, z and g appear into the re-
action function of the prot-seeking rm a¤ecting its output. Note that an
increase of z positively a¤ects the output of the CSR rm and has ambigu-
ous e¤ects on the output of the prot-seeking rm. On the other hand, g
decreases both outputs but the e¤ect on the CSR is strong twice as the e¤ect
on the prot seeking rm. The prots of the CSR rm are:
Mcsr =
(a(1  z) + g) (a (1 + z)  2g)
(3  z)2 ; (6)
while the prots of the prot-seeking rm are:
Mps =
(a (1 + z)  2g)2
(3  z)2 : (7)
The combination of g and z determines the type of duopoly in equilibrium.
For the sake of simplicity we will focus the analysis on the case where prots
are positive in any possible duopoly type, according to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The necessary and su¢ cient condition for positive prots is:
g 2

a (2z   1)
2
;min

a (1 + z)
2
; a (1  z)

6
Proof. csr > 0 for all g 2

a (2z   1)
2
; 1

; Mcsr > 0 for all g 2

0;
a (1 + z)
2

;
Mps > 0 for all g 2 (0; a (1  z)) and ps > 0 for all g 2 (0; 1) : Combining
these conditions we obtain the lemma.
The following proposition shows which duopoly type occurs depending on
the values of g and z (note that a can be normalised to one without changing
any result).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium duopoly is:
(i) PS for all
g 2

2az
3
;min

a (1 + z)
2
; a (1  z)

; (8)
(ii) CSR for all
g 2

a (2z3   9z2 + 12z   3)
2z2   8z + 9 ;min

2az
3
; a (1  z)

; (9)
(iii) mixed for all
g 2

a (2z   1)
2
;min

a (2z3   9z2 + 12z   3)
2z2   8z + 9 ; a (1  z)

: (10)
Proof. Beginning by (8), we have ps > Mcsr; 
M
ps > csr for all g > 2az=3; so
that the game yields (PS,PS) as the unique equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies. Moreover, ps > csr for all g > a (3 + 2z) =6 > 2az=3; if instead
g 2

2az
3
;
a (3 + 2z)
6

(11)
the equilibrium is the outcome of a prisonersdilemma.
In (9) Mps < csr for all g > a (2z
3   9z2 + 12z   3) = (2z2   8z + 9) and
Mcsr > ps > csr for all g < 2az=3: Given 
M
csr > ps > csr > 
M
ps the game
yields (CSR,CSR) generated by a prisonersdilemma.
In (10) we have ps < Mcsr for all g > a (2z   1) =2 > (5z   3) =6 and
Mps > csr for all g < a (2z
3   9z2 + 12z   3) = (2z2   8z + 9) : Here, Matrix
7
1 is a chicken game with two asymmetric equilibria along the secondary
diagonal.
Figure 1: Duopoly equilibria
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negative prots
Figure 1 illustrates the combination between the impact of productivity
on pollution g and the CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus z allowing a
Cournot-Nash, a mixed or a CSR duopoly equilibrium. In the north-west
region of Figure 1 (between g1 and g3), the impact of productivity on pollu-
tion is quite high, so that a rm being CSR would impose itself a substantial
increase in the marginal cost. As a consequence, both rms decide to be
prot-seeking. As g becomes lower and the CSR sensitivity to consumer sur-
8
plus increases, initially (between g3 and g4) the CSR prot is higher than the
prot-seeking prot, but one rm has the incentive to become prot-seeking
if the other is CSR, both choose CSR and so the equilibrium is a PS generated
by a prisoners dilemma; then (between g4 and g5) the e¤ect of z becomes
stronger, making the output increase compared to the prot-seeking case so
that ps > csr, but one rm has the incentive to become CSR if the other
is prot-seeking. Therefore both choose to be CSR, resulting in a prisoners
dilemma in a CSR duopoly. Finally (below g5) the high CSR sensitivity to
consumer surplus makes a CSR rm obtain highest prots if the other is
prot-seeking and at the same time the prot-seeking rm has no desire to
change type, as Mps > csr. Hence the equilibrium is mixed.
4 Oligopoly
We analyse now a market with n > 2. Consider the case where k 2
f1; ::; n  1g rms are CSR and n k are prot-seeking, representing a generic
mixed oligopoly. In this is case the market equilibrium is given by:
qkps =
a(1  kz) + gk
1 + n  kz : (12)
and
qkcsr =
a (1 + z (n  k))  g (1 + n  k)
1 + n  kz ; (13)
where the superscript k stands for oligopoly with k CSRrms, and qMps ; q
M
csr >
0 if
g 2

a (kz   1)
k
;
a (nz + 1  kz)
n+ 1  k

: (14)
The prots of any individual prot-seeking rm are
kps =
(a+ k (g   az))2
(1 + n  kz)2 ; (15)
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while the prots of any individual CSR rm are
kcsr =
(a+ k (g   az)) (a (1 + z (n  k))  g (1 + n  k))
(1 + n  kz)2 : (16)
Finally, the conditions of output positivity (14) ensures kps; 
k
csr > 0.
We obtain the stability conditions of the market structure with k CSR
rms and n   k prot seeking rms through the requirements for stable
cartels (see DAspremont et al., 1983 and Donsimoni et al., 1986). A mixed
oligopoly with k rms choosing the CSR type and n   k the prot-seeking
type is stable if no one CSR rm desires to become prot-seeking (internal
stability) and at the same time no one prot-seeking rm desires to shift to
CSR (external stability). We denote as
k 1ps =
(a+ k (g   az))2
(1 + n  kz)2 ; (17)
the prots of one prot-seeking rm if one CSR changes its type. We denote
as
k+1csr =
(a (1  z (k + 1)) + g (k + 1)) (a (1 + z (n  (k + 1)))  g (n  k))
(1 + n  (k + 1) z)2 ;
(18)
the prots of one CSR rm if one prot-seeking changes its type. Hence
the stability conditions for a market structure with k CSR rms and n   k
prot-seeking rms are:(
kcsr > 
k 1
ps (internal stability)
kps > 
k+1
csr (external stability)
; (19)
where
kcsr > 
k 1
ps )
(a+ k (g   az)) (a (1 + z (n  k))  g (1 + n  k))
(1 + n  kz)2 >
(a (1  z (k   1)) + g (k   1))2
(1 + n  z (k   1))2 ; (20)
10
and
kps > 
k+1
csr )
(a+ k (g   az))2
(1 + n  kz)2 >
(a (1  z (k + 1)) + g (k + 1)) (a (1 + z (n  (k + 1)))  g (n  k))
(1 + n  (k + 1) z)2 : (21)
The following proposition shows the stability conditions of the mixed
oligopoly with k CSR rms and n  k prot-seeking rm.
Proposition 2 If
g 2
 
a
 
n2 (kz   1) +  (z (k   1))2   1 (kz   1) + nz (2k (1  z (k   1))  1)
1 + n  k + k (n+ z   kz)2 ;
a
 
n2 (z (k + 1)  1) +  (kz)2   1 (z (k + 1)  1) + nz (1 + 2k   2kz (1 + k))
n  k + (k + 1) (n  kz)2
!
;
z >
2
n
and k <
nz
2
then the mixed oligopoly with k rms choosing a CSR
type and n  k choosing a prot-seeking type is stable.
Proof. Inequality (20) holds for all
g 2
 
a
 
n2 (kz   1) +  (z (k   1))2   1 (kz   1) + nz (2k (1  z (k   1))  1)
1 + n  k + k (n+ z   kz)2 ;
anz
n+ 1
!
;
(22)
where k <
2z + n
2z
ensures that
a
 
n2 (kz   1) +  (z (k   1))2   1 (kz   1) + nz (2k (1  z (k   1))  1)
1 + n  k + k (n+ z   kz)2 <
anz
n+ 1
:
(23)
Since k  1; then 2z + n
2z
> 1; which is always veried for all
n
2z
> 0:
Inequality (21) holds for all
g <
a
 
n2 (z (k + 1)  1) +  (kz)2   1 (z (k + 1)  1) + nz (1 + 2k   2kz (1 + k))
n  k + (k + 1) (n  kz)2
11
_g > anz
n+ 1
; (24)
where k <
nz
2
ensures that
a
 
n2 (z (k + 1)  1) +  (kz)2   1 (z (k + 1)  1) + nz (1 + 2k   2kz (1 + k))
n  k + (k + 1) (n  kz)2 <
anz
n+ 1
:
(25)
Note that, given k <
nz
2
and n > 2; then
nz
2
> 2 and thus z >
4
n
: Since
nz
2
<
2z + n
2z
, k <
nz
2
is su¢ cient for (20). The two inequalities hold simul-
taneously in a range where:
a
 
n2 (kz   1) +  (z (k   1))2   1 (kz   1) + nz (2k (1  z (k   1))  1)
1 + n  k + k (n+ z   kz)2 <
a
 
n2 (z (k + 1)  1) +  (kz)2   1 (z (k + 1)  1) + nz (1 + 2k   2kz (1 + k))
n  k + (k + 1) (n  kz)2 :
(26)
The condition k <
nz
2
is su¢ cient to ensure that this range exists.
Finally, we verify if kps; 
k
csr > 0, that is if g is within the range described
in (14). The su¢ cient condition is that the stability range is within the
positive prot range, i.e.:
a (nz + 1  wz)
n+ 1  w >
a
 
n2 (z (k + 1)  1) +  (kz)2   1 (z (k + 1)  1) + nz (1 + 2k   2kz (1 + k))
n  k + (k + 1) (n  kz)2 ;
(27)
and
a
 
n2 (kz   1) +  (z (k   1))2   1 (kz   1) + nz (2k (1  z (k   1))  1)
1 + n  k + k (n+ z   kz)2 >
a (wz   1)
w
: (28)
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We rearrange (27):
a (n+ 1  kz) ((n  kz) (n+ 1  z (k + 1)) + z   1)
(n+ 1  k) (n+ n2 (k + 1)  2nkz (k + 1) + k (kz2 (1 + k)  1)) : (29)
The numerator is positive since (n  kz) (n+ 1  z (k + 1)) > 1. The de-
nominator is positive for n2 (k + 1)   2nkz (k + 1) > 0; which holds for all
k <
nz
2
: We rearrange (28):
a (n+ 1  kz)
w
 
n+ 1 + k (n2   1)  2nkz (k   1) + kz2 (k   1)2 : (30)
The denominator is positive for k (n2   1)   2nkz (k   1) > 0; which holds
for all k <
nz
2
:
According to Proposition 2, the equilibrium in mixed oligopoly is stable
if the number of CSR rms is su¢ ciently low. We now show an example of
mixed oligopoly using appropriate parameter values and solving numerically.
We set n = 20; a = 10 and, according to Proposition 2, z = 1=3, so that
z >
4
n
. Figure 2 shows Proposition 2 in the space {k; g} with k 2 (1; 19).
For all g 2 (0; 1) ; Proposition 2 holds when k is 2 or 3.
Figure 2. Interval of k ensuring stability
5 10 15
2
1
1
2
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Thus we set k = 3; ensuring k <
nz
2
also, and show the system of stability
conditions (20)-(21): The mixed oligopoly is stable whenever the system (20)-
(21) holds, i.e., when the two functions are positive simultaneously. Figure
3 shows that conditions hold in 0:06 . g . 0:86.
Figure 3. Stability conditions for a mixed oligopoly
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5 Concluding remarks
We examined the conditions determining the stability of a mixed oligopoly
where prot-seeking and CSR rms coexist in the presence of an environmen-
tal externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of
productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus. In
addition, a mixed oligopoly equilibrium is stable if the number of CSR is
su¢ ciently low.
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